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Resumo 
Quando os militares assumiram o poder em 1964, justificaram a 
sua intervenção com uma ameaça para segurança nacional e 
desenvolvimento econômico. O “desenvolvimentismo” liberal 
parecia ser arruinado. Brasil e os outros países do Cone Sul 
demonstraram que o processo de modernização não devia levar, 
quase inevitavelmente, à democracia pluralista, como alguns 
teoristas tinham prognosticado. Ao contrário, em países em via 
de desenvolvimento, com um alto grau de heterogeneidade 
estrutural, esta modernização (conservador) podia resultar numa 
ditadura de tipo “burocrático-autoritário” e demobilisador que 
seguiria um “modelo de desenvolvimento associado-
dependente”. Porém, já nos anos setenta do século passado 
cientistas políticos e economistas começaram a discutir de novo 
o caráter aparentemente inovador do sistema político e do 
modelo de desenvolvimento dos militares. Philip Schmitter e 
Thomas E. Skidmore realçaram as continuidades entre o Estado 
Novo de Getúlio Vargas e o autoritarismo burocrático. Outros 
acadêmicos defenderam o seu ponto de vista segundo o qual a 
Doctrina de Segurança Nacional, a base politico-ideológica do 
golpe de 1964, foi o produto da Escola Superior de Guerra e, 
portanto, do período de pós-guerra. Este artigo retoma a tese de 
Schmitter e Skidmore e aplica-a à formação de um Estado de 
segurança nacional. Eu quero argumentar que os têrmos de 
“segurança nacional” e “desenvolvimento econômico” foram 
introduzidos já alguns anos antes da instalação do Estado Novo 
e sustituiram o binômio positivista de “ordem e progresso”. 
Ainda que o surgimento do populismo e o começo da Guerra 
Fria contribuissem à elaboração e reinterpretação do conceito 
original de segurança nacional, a ESG podia partir do legado 
Varguista. 
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Abstract 
When the Brazilian military took power in 1964, they justified 
their intervention by pointing to a threat to both national 
security and economic development. Liberal desenvolvimentismo 
seemed to be bankrupt. Brazil and other countries of the Cono 
Sur proved that modernisation did not inevitably lead to 
democracy, as some theorists had prognosticated. On the 
contrary, in take-off countries with a high degree of structural 
heterogeneity it could result in a new, “bureaucratic-
authoritarian” type of dictatorship which demobilised and 
depoliticised society and embraced a model of “associated-
dependent development.” However, it would not take long 
before social scientists and economists began to debate how new 
the military’s polity and their development model actually were. 
Philip Schmitter and Thomas E. Skidmore emphasised the 
continuities between Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo and the new 
bureaucratic authoritarianism. Other scholars continued to stress 
that the military’s Doctrine of National Security, the rationale for 
the 1964 coup, was rooted in the Escola Superior de Guerra and 
therefore remained a product of the post-war period. This article 
takes up Schmitter’s and Skidmore’s thesis and applies it to the 
formation of a national security state. I want to argue that the 
terms of “national security” and “economic development” were 
introduced long before the installation of the Estado Novo and 
replaced the positivist binomial of “order” and “progress”. 
Although the emergence of populism and the beginning of the 
Cold War would contribute to a further elaboration and 
reinterpretation of the original concept of national security, the 
ESG could build upon Vargas’s legacy. 
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When the Brazilian military took power in 1964, they justified their intervention 
by pointing to a threat to both national security and economic development. Liberal 
developmentalism, with its belief in ‘universalistic and unilinear progression toward a 
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good society’ and its extrapolation from European and U.S. models, seemed to be 
bankrupt (Martz/Myers, 1992: 265). Brazil and other countries of the Cono Sur proved 
that modernisation did not inevitably lead to democracy, as both Rostow and Lipset had 
prognosticated. On the contrary, in relatively backward and dependent countries with a 
high degree of structural heterogeneity it could result in a demobilising and depoliticising 
dictatorship. Guillermo O’Donnell (1980) coined the term ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ 
for the regime the military established, while Dieter Nohlen and his students 
(Nohlen/Thibaut, 1992: 66-67) spoke of a ‘new military regime’. For Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1973), the insurgent generals embraced a new economic strategy of ‘associated-
dependent development’ combining domestic and foreign capital under the auspices of a 
modernising State (see also: Evans 1979). However, during Brazil’s long abertura, social 
scientists (Cammack 1985; Lauth 1985) and economists (Thorp, 1984: 13-14; 
Sangmeister, 1992: 273-4) began to debate how new the polity of the military dictatorship 
and its development model actually were. Given that the 1964 coup d’etat marked the 
beginning of a critical realignment in South America, an answer to this question was of 
importance not only in Brazil but also regionally.  
While a number of historians traced authoritarian-patrimonial rule back to the 
Old Republic, the Empire, or even the colonial period, Philip Schmitter (1973: 182) and 
Thomas E. Skidmore (1973: 38-43) emphasised the continuities between Getúlio 
Vargas’s Estado Novo (1937-45) and ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism.’ Others continued to 
argue that the military’s Doctrine of National Security, the rationale for the 1964 coup, 
was rooted in the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), founded in 1949, and therefore 
represented a product of the post-war period. It was not seen as a continuation of 
Vargas’s policy but rather as a departure from it. 
In this paper, I intend to take up Schmitter’s and Skidmore’s thesis and apply it to 
the formation of a national security state. I want to argue that the terms ‘national 
security’ and ‘economic development’ were introduced long before the installation of the 
Estado Novo and replaced the Positivist binomial ‘order and progress’ which had 
characterised the country’s transition from monarchy to republic and Rio Grande do 
Sul’s Castilhismo. Although the emergence of populism and the beginning of the Cold 
War would contribute to a further elaboration and reinterpretation of the concept of 
national security, the Supreme War College could build upon Vargas’s legacy. 
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My study is divided into four sections. First, I shall examine how the military 
legitimised their 1964 coup. In the second step, I will analyse the institutionalisation of 
the Doctrine of National Security until the consolidation of an authoritarian polity in 
1969. From this basis, a retrospective view can be taken of how state security was 
defined and organised under Vargas’s dictatorial regime. Finally, the adjustment of this 
concept to new domestic and international conditions after 1945 has to be explored. The 
conclusion will focus on functional equivalents in the formation of the two national 
security states. In this paper, I will place emphasis on the institutional, rather than the 
personal and structural, dimension of ‘violence’ (Waldmann, 1977) and highlight the 
political-ideological aspects of ‘culture’. 
 
1. Brazil’s Regeneration: Rationale for the 1964 Coup 
By the late 1950s, import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), which had begun 
after the Great Depression and converted Brazil into a take-off country, entered a cul-de-
sac. Consumer durables could now be produced domestically but a large-scale 
replacement of capital good importations depended on an increase in foreign investment 
and the latter in turn on an abandonment of rigid economic nationalism. Furthermore, 
even in its first stage, ISI had not been guided by domestic mass demand nor did it 
stimulate the exportation of national products. Industries were internationally 
uncompetitive, had a restricted internal market, and accumulated debts with suppliers of 
intermediary products. Brazilian society had remained regionally and socially distorted. 
The agrarian sector suffered from the unilateral macro-economic orientation towards 
industrialisation. Neither the traditional nor the modern capital-intensive branches of 
industry, which already produced their own labour surplus, were able to further absorb 
rural migrants. As a consequence, the agrarian question was aggravated. The foundation 
of peasant leagues in the Northeast, supported by Communists, trade unionists, leftist 
intellectuals, liberation theologists, and populist politicians, caused concern among 
Brazil’s conservative classes. When rural workers began to demand their ‘1930’, it 
became obvious that the populist pact which Vargas had created between State and 
urban proletariat was clearly overstretched. His heir João Goulart, faced with an annual 
inflation rate of more than 100 percent, a considerable government deficit, and a 
decrease in economic growth, had insufficient revenue for a redistributive policy in 
favour of the urban and rural masses. Nonetheless, he promised ‘basic reforms’ in the 
agrarian sector, banking, tax and the electoral system. Though this was rather meant as a 
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preventative measure against a possible revolutionary threat (with regard to his attitude 
towards entrepreneurs, see Toledo, 1994: 33) and for some leftist analysts did not go far 
enough (Frank, 1969: 348), his enemies, among them the military, felt the opposite was 
the case: Goulart would actually prepare the ground for a leftist coup against the 
country’s democratic institutions and (already restricted) market economy. Similarly, U.S. 
officials were obsessed with the possible emergence of a second Cuba and a 
terceiromundismo policy following decolonisation in Africa.  
A small circle of high-ranking ESG graduates, who were also linked to a private 
conservative think tank, the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais, formed what Dulles 
(1980: 21) called an ‘estado-maior informal’, i.e. a co-ordinating centre for a possible coup: 
Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, Ernesto Geisel, Golbery do Couto e Silva, and 
Ademar de Queirós (see also Abreu, 2001: 1215ff). This group was horrified by the 
increasing mass mobilisation instigated by Communists and populist demagogues and 
ranked the elimination of this domestic threat to the existing social and economic order 
higher than the army’s more conventional task of national defence. For the ESG, the 
latter had become part of a wider concept of ‘national security’ which included military, 
political, psycho-social, and economic instruments to deal with external and internal 
enemies: training, equipment, and mobilisation of the armed forces and control of the 
security apparatus in a wider sense; rational institution-building and decision-making 
procedures; formation of a national consciousness based on a consensus of Christian and 
democratic [sic] values; formation of capital and its investment in industries, agriculture, 
infrastructure, and social policies. In this concept, ‘national security’ and ‘economic 
development’ could not be separated. Without first decapitating the Left, removing 
populists from power, and placing government authority in the hands of a coalition of 
patriotic military, apolitical technocrats, and responsible entrepreneurs, the new elite 
emphasised, it would not be possible to create a new polity and implement an unpopular, 
but necessary and well thought-through, programme of economic stabilisation. The 
success of this programme and the consequent generation of high growth rates would 
then fund a modernisation of the army, allow social reforms, strengthen cohesion in 
society, and consolidate the political institutions; in short, national security would be 
cemented. For these ESG disciples, long-term growth depended on embarking on a new 
‘development’ model. According to Aarão Reis Filho (2001: 6), ‘they intended to destroy, 
in its foundations, the national-statist order and traditions which Jango [Goulart] 
represented and replace them by an internationalist-liberal alternative which focused on 
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an economic opening towards the international market; incentives for private, including 
foreign, capital; [and] a different, more regulative than interventionist, role of the State in 
the economy.’  
When the military actually intervened in politics in March 1964 and Castello 
Branco became president, it was not an individual, but the armed forces as a corporation, 
who exercised power and focused on a transformation of State and society following 
ESG guidelines. The State was described as a ‘political-institutional organ or as an 
instrument of collective well-being’ (Schneider, 1971: 247). It was to define and achieve 
short-term and permanent national objectives and stand above the antagonisms existing 
within a historically and culturally mature society. For ESG ideologues, an optimum 
‘national policy’ had to take into account the country’s ‘natural’ or ‘supra-social’ 
conditions such as geography, resources, and infrastructure and to guide ‘government 
policy.’ Such a concept would distinguish their decision-making from the 
‘incrementalism’ which had characterised populist policies (Schneider, 1971: 246-7; Werz, 
1992:,122-41). In other words, the ESG was convinced it was the only group to have an 
alternative policy for rational state and nation-building, output-oriented modernisation of 
the economy, unification of the country, and achievement of regional great-power status. 
Moreover, they had the personnel and institutionalised power to implement their 
strategy. Last but not least, in their self-image, they did not represent a specific social 
class but the entire nation. Those who attacked them were depicted as the Anti-Nation 
and became the target of the national security apparatus. 
 
2. The ‘Coup Within the Coup’: The Formation of Brazil’s National 
Security State by 1968/1969 
It should be emphasised once again that the military around Castello Branco did 
not intervene in politics to abolish the 1946 Constitution but, as they declared, in order 
to regenerate or ‘purify’ the existing democratic system (Rouquie/Suffern, 1994: 252). 
Consequently, they called their coup a ‘revolution’ and their regime a ‘democracia guiada’ 
(Bethell, 1992: 12). Just as in 1889 and 1930 the army considered itself the guardian of 
the nation. It valued the guarantee (and improvement) of the Constitution higher than 
the legitimacy of the (elected) government whose politics and policies had undermined 
the State and left it unprotected. This was a conservative interpretation of the ‘citizen-
soldier’ doctrine which had guided Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães and his 
‘young officers’ in 1889 and the tenentes in 1930.  
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The ‘authoritarian liberals’ (Rouquie/Suffern, 1994: 252) who took over power in 
1964 ‘sought to establish a highly centralised technocracy which could provide the 
requisite institutional conditions for economic planning’ (Schneider, 1971: 113). Castello 
Branco initially defined his government as temporary. He thought that, once anarchy was 
overcome and technocratic rule established, (engineered) presidential elections could take 
place. Moreover, Castello Branco was willing to collaborate with civilians, in particular 
the União Democrática Nacional (UDN). Those politicians shared the military’s abhorrence 
of Getulismo and of the parties which administered Vargas’s legacy, the Partido Social-
Democrático (PSD) and especially the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB).  
Indeed, it was not only parties on the extreme left, most notably Moscow-
oriented and Maoist Communists, but also populist leaders and their loyal public 
servants, trade unionists, and leftist intellectuals who suffered from the promulgation, in 
1964, of a first Ato Institucional (AI) allowing amendments to the 1946 Constitution. This 
Institutional Act was to expire at the end of the presidential term in January 1966 (later 
extended to 1967). Until 15 June 1964 it authorised the executive to revoke legislative 
mandates and to deprive citizens of their political rights for a period of up to ten years. 
441 Brazilians were affected, among them the three presidents who had followed Vargas 
in office after his suicide in 1954. In the two months following the coup, police and 
military arrested between 10,000 and 50,000 people and tortured several hundred for 
more than two days. However, the government refused demands from hard-line military 
to extend this witch-hunt beyond the expiry date. Job security in the public services was 
suspended for six months thereby allowing more time for purges. Not only civilians lost 
their employment, 122 officers were also forced to retire. Thereafter, however, 
persecution diminished and censorship was moderate (Skidmore, 1988: 23-7). Finally, still 
in 1964, the Castello Branco administration created a notorious secret service, the Serviço 
Nacional de Informação (SNI), headed by General Golbery de Couto, although initially this 
was to be a civil government body.  
The AI-1, which prepared Castello Branco’s election by a purged Congress, 
marked the first step to a political centralisation and concentration of powers in the 
executive branch. However, the administration proved unable to hermetically control the 
country, much to the disgust of hard-liners who considered all civil politicians to be 
incapable and corrupt and had favoured, from the start, a more permanent role for the 
armed forces in Brazilian politics. They began to exert pressure on Castello Branco. As a 
consequence, whenever a possible inroad for the opposition appeared the military 
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government answered with yet another institutional act which further limited civil 
liberties and political rights. AI-2, promulgated in October 1965, was a reaction to the 
unexpected election of two PSD/PTB-supported governors in key states. Though 
Castello Branco respected their mandates, similar surprises were to be prevented in the 
future. The institutional act and various complimentary acts which followed gave the 
government the right to abolish all political parties (including the UDN), to deprive 
adversaries of their constitutional guarantees and political rights, and to make the election 
of the president indirect. Moreover, the executive further strengthened its power at the 
cost of the judiciary branch: it increased the number of judges on the Supreme Court 
from 11 to 16, further limited the court’s authority to review the actions of the 
government, and placed crimes by individuals against national security under the 
jurisdiction of military courts. By the end of 1965 two new parties were founded, the 
government party Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA) and the ‘opposition’ party 
Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB). Just four months later, in February 1966, AI-3 
required that state assemblies had to choose their governor who would then, after 
formally consulting the legislative, appoint the prefects of state capital municipalities. 
With the two new parties in place and purges under way, the legislature had become a 
mere ‘rubber stamp’ (Burns, 1993: 455-6). The 1967 Constitution ended the experiment 
in ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and made Brazil a barely disguised dictatorship (Martins 1993; 
Excerpts 1999). 
When a National Security Law (Decree-Law 314) was promulgated on 13 March 
1967, coinciding with Castello Branco’s departure from office (15 March), the hard-liners 
had already set the tone. Article 1 declared: ‘every individual or juridical entity is 
responsible for national security within the limits defined by the law’ (cited in Skidmore, 
1988: 57). These limits were narrow. Castello Branco himself justified the law as an 
appropriate answer to any attempt at ‘adverse psychological’ or ‘revolutionary warfare’ 
against the State. The former was defined as ‘the employment of propaganda, 
counterpropaganda, and actions in the political, economic, psychosocial, and military 
areas designed to influence or provoke opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of 
foreign, enemy, neutral, or friendly groups against the attainment of the national 
objectives’. Warfare was then ‘revolutionary’ when an ‘internal conflict, generally inspired 
by an ideology, or assisted from abroad, [sought] subversive conquest of power by 
means of progressive control of the Nation’ (Dulles, 1980: 448).  
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The hardening of Castello Branco’s position resulted not least from the limited 
success of his economic stabilisation programme. AI-1 had already given the president 
the exclusive right to propose expenditure bills to Congress which the latter could not 
increase. This was part of the strategy to restore public finances. Technocrats led by 
planning minister Roberto Campos and minister of finance Octávio Bulhões created a 
central bank and implemented an anti-inflationary policy (Skidmore, 1999: 177-8). 
Exports were promoted and the investment climate for private domestic and foreign 
capital improved (Hartlyn/Valenzuela, 1994: 142; Skidmore, 1985: 115-6). However, 
progress was slow and social costs high: the influx of international capital remained 
moderate while real wages fell and unemployment increased. This resulted in social and 
political protests which were perceived as a threat to national security. However, the 
hope that the 1967 National Security Law would quell any opposition was shattered. 
1968 saw the climax of political protest. Workers went on strike in Osasco (São Paulo) 
and other cities and corporatist union leaders (who had an ‘ideology attestation’ by the 
military) proved unable to control their organisations. Urban middle classes and the 
Catholic Church began to raise their voices against a socially unjust austerity policy and 
institutionalised violence. A powerful student movement was organised and often 
displayed solidarity with striking workers. In some cases, both groups had considerable 
influence on local governments (Hall/Garcia, 1989: 182-4). One federal deputy, Márcio 
Moreira Alves, called upon Brazilians to voice their protest against militarism. For hard-
line military, this was the result of Castello Branco’s yielding policy, at least after the 
initial purges. Now that they were in charge and the linha branda with its ESG-ideology 
marginalised, they wanted to carry out a ‘coup within the coup’ and install a national 
security state. However, even Castello’s hard-line successors Arthur da Costa e Silva 
(1967-1969) and Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-74) shared what Skidmore (1988: 57-8) 
calls the Brazilian elites’ wide-spread assumption ‘that the solution to any problem was a 
new law’. Therefore, even they maintained a pseudo-democratic façade: on 13 December, 
AI-5 closed (but did not abolish) Congress and state assemblies, suspended the 1967 
Constitution, imposed censorship, and placed crimes against national security under the 
jurisdiction of military courts. In January 1968, the National Security Council was 
reorganised. Its military president became a cabinet minister (Schneider, 1971: 237-8).  
Similarly, the government reshaped the SNI which would now combine the 
functions of a federal investigative police, secret service, military intelligence coordinator, 
and national security advisory board. It became an ‘invisible government’ 
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(Rouquier/Suffern, 1995: 253). Its head, a senior army officer who presided over 
approximately 5,000 employees, had the rank of a minister and was often the first choice 
when it came to the (indirect) election of a new (military) President of the Republic (both 
Médici and Euclides Figueiredo had previously headed the security service). The SNI was 
not subjected to any outside (financial) supervision. Its agents worked in every 
government agency, state enterprise, university, and branch of the armed forces. From 
the early 1970s, the army, navy, and air force had their own intelligence agencies though 
the SNI remained intact (Conniff/McCann, 1989: 266-7; Stepan, 1973: 58-9). Its 
founder, Golbery de Couto, admitted at the end of his life that he had created a 
‘monster.’ Moreover, he disapproved of AI-5 and warned his friends in the U.S. embassy 
as early as January 1969 that Costa e Silva lacked leadership qualities and was surrounded 
by some incompetent military hard-liners. Shortly thereafter, Washington began to 
distance itself from Rio and reduced economic and military aid (Sotero, 1998). 
The militarisation of society made a legal opposition impossible and therefore 
resulted in the organisation of an urban guerrilla, with Carlos Marighela’s Action for 
National Liberation (ALN) being the most formidable group. This armed resistance, in 
turn, led to a further aggravation of the 1967 National Security Law. Its modified version 
of March 1969 (Decree-Law 510) provided more severe penalties for terrorism, bank 
robberies and the interruption of public services, the usual guerrilla tactics, and strictly 
forbade, and punished through military courts, the ‘fostering of animosity toward the 
Armed Forces’ (Schneider, 1971: 279). This legislation was followed by a Constitutional 
Amendment No. 1 in October 1969 which, among other things, facilitated federal 
government intervention in the states; limited parliamentary immunity; strengthened the 
decree-law powers of the executive branch and the role of the military in the Superior 
Military Tribunal; prolonged the duration of a ‘state of siege’ decree; and introduced the 
death penalty, along with a confiscation of property, for those who had engaged in 
external warfare or any subversive or revolutionary act against the State. None of the 
institutional acts since AI-5 had, as those before did have, an expiry date; they were to 
remain in force as long as the military saw fit (Schneider, 1971: 302-3). This was until the 
beginning of the abertura in 1979.  
By the end of October 1969, when General Médici took over power, the 
formation of a national security state was complete. The institutions and legislation had 
effaced the boundaries between State and society, public and private spheres, internal 
security and public safety. The militarisation of day-to-day life had reached such a scale 
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that the founder of the ESG, General Cordeiro de Farias, and the intellectual mastermind 
of the coup, Golbery do Couto, became open advocates of an abertura. Under Médici, 
politicians, diplomats, academics, and writers were, once again, blacklisted and lost their 
job. Already in April 1969, more than 200 individuals were expelled from Congress, state 
assemblies, the diplomatic service, Foreign Ministry, universities, and media. Among 
them were the Rector of the University of São Paulo and internationally known 
historians (Caio Prado Júnior, Emília Viotti da Costa), social scientists (Florestan 
Fernandes, Octávio Ianni, Fernando Henrique Cardoso), and physicists (Mário 
Schemberg). Equally, journalist Antônio Callado lost his political rights (Schneider, 1971: 
285). If modern means of communication were used for ‘subversive propaganda’, then 
article 5 of the 1969 National Security Law prescribed a punishment of up to four years 
in prison (Flynn, 1978: 424). Censorship was especially harsh with regard to television 
and radio which reached an ever increasing part of the population. In contrast, print 
media and literature enjoyed slightly more freedom since, in a developing country with a 
high illiteracy rate, they rather targeted a small intellectual elite (Ginway, 1999). However, 
the effects of this national security legislation went further than depriving intellectuals 
and politicians of their political rights and censoring the media. During the Médici 
government alone, 4,460 political trials took place (Bernecker/Pietschmann/Zoller, 
2000: 285). Until 1972, Amnesty International registered 1,076 cases of torture by 472 
individual, often sadistic, torturers. A considerable number of Brazilians ‘disappeared’, a 
euphemism for political murder. The repressive apparatus included police, army, and 
paramilitary forces (Skidmore, 1988: 125-35, 150). 
Nonetheless, the administration continued to portray its regime as democratic, 
directed against counter-revolutionary and unpatriotic elements who prevented the 
country from progressing towards a bright future. To get their message across, the 
military created a programme of civic and moral education which focused on ‘obedience 
to the law, commitment to work, and integration into the community’ (Grupo da 
Educação Moral e Cívica 1999). It was adjusted to every stage of an educational career, 
from kindergarten to university. Indoctrination did not stop here. General Médici 
installed a highly successful propaganda agency, the Assessoria de Relações Públicas (AERP), 
which tried to counter-mobilise the population by politicising sport, especially football, 
and promoting Carnival, popular music, and telenovelas (Skidmore, 1988: 110-1). The 
attempt to unite the nation behind a cultural nationalism ‘from above’ did not always 
have the desired effects. Some artists, like the Tropicalistas, used the manoeuvring space 
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the regime offered them to criticise it but it would not take long before they collided with 
the National Security Law (Dunn 1999). 
The second half of the Costa e Silva government and especially the Médici 
administration not only represented the most repressive phase of Brazil’s military 
dictatorship, they also coincided with the so-called ‘Brazilian Miracle’. Between 1968 and 
the first oil price shock in 1973, Brazil produced unparalleled growth rates of more than 
ten per cent, left its South American competitor for regional hegemony, Argentina, well 
behind, and engaged in an ‘internal expansionism’ into the hinterland, especially the 
Amazon, which had geopolitical (border security, prevention of a ‘balkanization’ of Brazil 
through the international recognition of First Nations), economic (exploration of raw 
materials) and social reasons (distribution of new land in the Interior instead of an agrarian 
reform in the centres of colonisation) (Burns, 1993: 485-6). This expansionism and 
creation of a national consciousness was supported by the development of television 
(Mattos 1982). The regime’s propaganda machine AERP made sure that ‘many Brazilians 
[…] concluded that increased national power and a rapidly growing economy were the 
result of going authoritarian’ (Skidmore, 1988: 110). Those who did not step into this 
trap and criticised the political, social, and ecological costs of Brazil’s development 
‘model’ were targeted by the national security apparatus. The new legislation explicitly 
forbade the distribution of negative news about the national economy (Skidmore, 1988: 
134).  
When the ‘miracle’ started, the new internationalist-liberal strategy of ‘economic 
development’ had already largely failed. Castello Branco himself was never an 
uncompromising advocate of economic liberalism. He considered nationalism ‘an engine 
of national history’ as long as it contributed to the attainment of national objectives, 
instead of class conflict, and accepted competition and partnership with foreign capital 
(Dulles, 1980: 453-4). The possibilities of political and economic control which 
corporatist decision-making and state interventionism offered, always prevented him 
from radically breaking with the national-statist traditions, all the more so when facing an 
increasing opposition (Reis Filho, 2001: 7). His successors Costa e Silva and Médici, 
obsessed with geopolitics and self-sustainability, were ‘right-wing authoritarian 
nationalists’ (Flynn, 1978: 377). They wanted to guarantee private capital accumulation, 
include domestic enterprises and trans-national companies into the structuring and 
implementation of national development plans, and mobilise foreign credits to close the 
gap between the need for investment and domestic savings. However, the State 
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consolidated its role as supreme planning and regulating authority, used its legal 
possibilities to intervene in the economy, and established monopolies in sectors deemed 
to be essential for national security (Sangmeister, 1992: 235). Moreover, when the world 
recession of 1974 hit Brazil and ended the ‘miracle’, Ernesto Geisel’s government even 
returned to an import-substituting industrialisation (Pereira, 1978: 24) while Chile’s and 
the second Argentinean military regime had learned the lessons and tried a neo-liberal 
approach. 
 
3. From ‘Order and Progress’ to ‘National Security and Economic 
Development’: Justification for a New Polity in Vargas’s Dictatorial Regime 
In their obsession to root out any form of unpredictable populist democracy, or 
Getulismo, Brazil’s military did not fully realise how much they stood in the tradition of 
the Estado Novo, or Varguismo. This requires a closer look at the origins of Brazil’s 
interwar authoritarian regime and its concern with national security and economic 
development.  
The 1930 ‘Revolution’ resulted from the breakdown of the Old Republic’s fragile 
system of regional ‘pillarisation’ and political clientelism. It was not a preventative step 
against further mass mobilisation, as in 1964. Though the 1920s were characterised by a 
crisis of social and regional participation, social mobilisation remained very limited and 
passed its climax by 1927/1928. There can be little doubt that, had the Great Depression 
not hit Brazil and reignited the political opposition, the café-com-leite coalition would have 
been successful in co-opting dissident factions as so often before. The events of 1930-
1937/8 followed a well-established pattern, already probed in 1817-1822/3 and 1888-
1889/94: they represented a mixture of conspiracy, civil/military coup, and limited 
reform following an aborted revolution or at least a defused political crisis.  
Though neither of the two main actors of the ‘revolution’, a new generation of 
gaúchos and highly politicised ‘young officers’ (tenentes), could rely on an elaborate and 
conclusive ideological concept, such as the ESG doctrine, an alternative political strategy 
did exist. Getúlio Vargas and his civil (Oswaldo Aranha et al) and military protégés (Pedro 
Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, Eurico Gaspar Dutra) followed the doctrine of their political 
master Júlio de Castilhos, a free interpreter of Auguste Comte, whose political ideas had 
been deeply inculcated into Rio Grande do Sul’s political institutions. The executivismo 
centralizante, ‘administrative continuity,’ and political and legal engineering, so typical of 
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the southern state, had guaranteed that Castilhos’s heir Antônio Augusto Borges de 
Medeiros remained in power for a quarter of a century. When Vargas became governor 
in 1928, he still shared the belief in the healing powers of a Positivist developmental and 
educational dictatorship but tried to find a new form of political representation which 
responded to the demands of a more urban and industrialised society. Italo-fascist ideas 
of restructuring State and society along corporatist lines began to fuse with, but did not 
contradict, the Positivist legacy. Vargas and his followers ‘had learnt all the subtle 
connotations of the word “order”: order as a conservative password, order which 
rationalised Borges’s restrictive regime, order which left no alternative to political 
opponents but rebellion, order which explained the most surprising changes of line […,] 
and order which was a prerequisite for progress, even social change’ (Bourne, 1974: 53). 
Order was the codeword for the formation of a centralised and corporatist nation state 
vested with authority (a euphemism for authoritarianism gaúcho-style) and progress 
translated as (delayed) industrialisation through a policy of economic nationalism. Not 
only was the former instrumental to the latter, modernisation would also provide political 
stability and a place for Brazil among the world’s ‘great nations.’  
Tenentes agreed with gaúchos that the (formally) liberal, federalist and outward-
looking state of the Old Republic, dominated by agrarian-export oligarchies and their 
belief in laissez-faire (though actual policies often departed from it) was to be replaced by a 
strong, centralist and nationalist regime which would be willing and able to intervene in 
both the economy and society in order to foster rapid and planned industrialisation. The 
Great Depression proved how important it was to overcome Brazil’s dependence on a 
few agricultural staple products, and a national-statist model seemed to be the only 
alternative to laissez-faire. 
The origins of an intellectually and politically engaged army can be traced back to 
the ‘young officers’ of the 1880s and the changes in military careers after the Paraguayan 
War. Moreover, due to the absence of a nation-wide war of liberation against the 
Portuguese, the Brazilian army was only founded after the Independência. The coincidence 
of civilian and military leader during Spanish America’s revolution for independence, 
fertile soil for the region’s chronic caudillismo, did not exist in Brazil. Here the army was 
not a reliable pillar of power. In political conflicts, it often sided with the revolutionary 
faction. When precisely this happened in the 1831 abdication crisis, a National Guard 
was founded. It was to counter-balance a revolutionary army (with coronelismo becoming a 
Brazilian variant of caudillismo) but this policy proved to be unsuccessful. During the war 
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of the Triple Alliance more middle class elements gained commissions and Positivists at 
the Military School of Praia Vermelha challenged the notion of a neutral army. After the 
war, ‘young officers’ joined the abolitionist and republican movements, and between 
1889 and 1894 they tried to implement their project of an enlightened despotism aiming 
at industrial-technical modernisation. However, eventually they had to succumb to 
powerful regional oligarchies which feared a politicised army, the only national institution 
during the Old Republic. The officer corps continued to feel neglected and complained 
about the civilian elites’ ignorance of national defence needs and their deviation from the 
1891 constitutional system.  
The army’s journal A defesa nacional, published between 1913 and 1922, reveals the 
ideas which motivated many ‘young officers’ to support the 1930 Revolution. Following 
nationalist Olavo Bilac, they hoped that their intervention would lead to a ‘political-social 
transformation’ of society, with them being the educators and organisers of the citizenry 
and the architects of a new Brazil. The country was seen as ‘an improvised nation, 
without roots in the past, and of indefinite ethnic formation, and therefore easy to break 
up.’ The enemy were not only foreign powers but also the country’s ‘lack of national 
cohesion.’ (McCann, 1989: 59). Among those who served on the journal’s editorial board 
were gaúchos like Dutra but also the young Castello Branco, who had received his military 
formation in Rio Grande do Sul but supported the state’s liberal opposition party (Abreu, 
2001: 1209).  
What was missing in the 1930 coalition, compared to 1964, was an aggressive 
class of industrial entrepreneurs and civil technocrats. Their formation and education 
‘from above’ would be one of Vargas’s and his supporters’ main objectives.  
The years from 1930 to 1937 were characterised by a crisis of hegemony which 
left little room for implementing a new political project. During the provisional 
government (1930-1934), Vargas faced harsh resistance from reunited regional 
oligarchies or, as one leading protagonist put it: the ‘rabble of anarchy’ against which an 
‘elite of order’ was to be mobilised.1 In 1932, São Paulo even tried a counter-revolution. 
Though Vargas used its defeat to deny 14 categories of opponents their political rights 
for the duration of three years, among them not only the leaders of the Paulista rebellion 
                                                           
1 FGO/CPDOC, OA 32.10.29 cp, folhas 974-979, O. Aranha to F. Da Cunha, Rio de Janeiro 29. 
10. 1932. 
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and their supporters in other states but also many politicians of the Old Republic,2 
repression and censorship remained rather moderate. Furthermore, given the fact that 
liberal constitutionalists retained power in the states, Vargas tried a policy of 
reconciliation which included the country’s re-constitutionalisation. It was the tenentes 
who held him in power during these difficult years and supported him in the engineering 
of the 1933 elections for a Constituent Assembly. However, the 1934 Constitution 
remained Janus-faced and preserved the hybrid status quo between Positivist gaúchos and 
national-revolutionary tenentes, on the one hand, and (oligarchic) liberal constitutionalists, 
on the other. 
As early as January 1934, General Góes Monteiro published a memorandum 
which assessed, in a pessimistic way, what had been achieved since the 1930 Revolution. 
In his judgement, Brazil’s unbalanced federation, the poverty and ignorance of the rural 
population, and the elites’ parasitism posed a threat to national security. Therefore, he 
concluded, it would be necessary to strengthen national cohesion, regulate the economy, 
rebuild the State, and sanitise the public administration. Army, police, and the judiciary 
system were to unite their forces in order to protect the government from any attempt at 
upheaval. This included, for instance, close co-operation between preventative police and 
military intelligence. Their network was to cover the national territory and, in addition, to 
target the centres of international intrigues and conspiracies. Furthermore, Góes 
Monteiro wanted to strengthen the repressive (military) police, which was still controlled 
by the states, and organise the Conselho de Defesa Nacional under the President’s leadership 
(a law from 1927 had already formally created such a council). As a co-ordinating 
political centre, it was to subordinate the Conselho Superior de Guerra, responsible for 
technical aspects of warfare.3  
This memorandum outlined a new security architecture. It would not take long 
before Góes Monteiro’s ideas became reality. In February 1934, Law No. 23873 indeed 
organised the Conselho de Defesa Nacional which was to include, as full members with the 
right to vote, the President, all ministers and the chiefs-of-staff of the armed forces. 
Other legislative acts created a Comissão de Estudos da Defesa Nacional, a potential think 
tank for questions of national defence, and seções de defesa nacional in each ministry. A 
Secretaria-Geral da Defesa Nacional centralised and co-ordinated decision-making in this 
                                                           
2 See PRO/FO 371/16548, A 115/115/6, W. Seeds to J. Simon, Rio de Janeiro 13. 12. 1933. 
3 See FGV/CPDOC, OA 34.01.29/2 cp, folhas 0692-0710, Memorandum by P. A. Góes 
Monteiro, to Finance Secretary O. Aranha, Rio de Janeiro 29. 1. 1934. 
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policy field and was directly responsible to the President. The 1934 Constitution (Article 
159) already referred to the installation of a Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional, and 
after 1934 the term ‘national security’ replaced that of ‘national defence’ in the names of 
study commissions and the Secretariat-General as well.4  
The creation of these institutions was complemented by new legislation. In April 
1935, Vargas promulgated a first National Security Law (No. 38),5 the main target of 
which was clearly the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), founded in March of the same 
year. The Communist Party which had just recovered from a five-year long period of 
self-destruction played a major role in the organisation and development of this popular 
front. The penalties the law provided were most severe though an earlier draft had gone 
even further.6 In the revised version, any attempt to change, by force, the Constitution or 
form of government could be punished with six to ten years in jail for ringleaders and 
five to eight for accomplices. Those who tried to prevent federal authorities from 
exercising their powers faced two to four years in prison. If the attack was directed 
against individual representatives of federal, state, or local governments, prison sentences 
varied between six months and three years. Other political crimes to be punished by 
imprisonment were the instigation of collective strikes, military insubordination, class 
struggle, or religious conflicts; the provocation of hostilities against or between the 
armed forces or between them and civil institutions; and the violation of individual or 
property rights for political, ideological, or religious motives. Building upon a previous 
law from November 1934 (Carone, 1977a: 84), this first National Security Law also 
focused on economic crimes which were considered a question of national security: 
among them the paralysis of public services and supplies; the instigation of employers 
and employees to interrupt work for reasons other than those resulting from the 
production process itself; or the manipulation of prices for necessary consumer goods 
with the purpose of gaining personal advantage. Finally, the law imposed censorship on 
the media. Radio stations, newspapers, and advertising companies which engaged in what 
the regime called subversive or war propaganda, faced the confiscation of publications 
and heavy fines. If criticising the government, trade unions and professional 
                                                           
4 See PRO/FO 371/18656, A 4406/4406/6, 1934 Annual Report by ambassador W. Seeds, to J. 
Simon, Rio de Janeiro 27. 4. 1935; Wahrlich 1983: 197, 598-600. 
5 See PRO/FO 371/18648, A 3834/120/6, enclosure to W. Seeds to J. Simon, Petrópolis 7. 4. 
1935.  
6 See PRO/FO 371/18655, A 2002/2002/6, enclosure to W. Seeds to J. Simon, Petrópolis 7. 2. 
1935. 
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organisations lost their legal status, civil servants and university teachers their position, 
members of the armed forces their commission, and naturalised foreigners their 
citizenship. 
Similar to 1967, such a draconian security law was supposed to prevent a further 
radicalisation and polarisation of society but the effort was in vain. On 5 July 1935, ANL 
president and Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes called upon Brazilians to overthrow 
the Vargas government thereby forcing the organisation into illegality. If initially the 
ANL had indeed enjoyed support from a broad spectrum of social and political forces, 
now it found itself converted into little more than a Trojan Horse of the Communist 
Party embracing the golpista strategy of its ex-tenente leader. The Intentona Comunista in 
November 1935 was not successful but provided Vargas with a justification for further 
strengthening national security legislation. In December 1935, a second, much tougher 
National Security Law followed (No. 136).7 It provided that, if a crime against the social 
and political order went hand in hand with the commitment of an ordinary crime, the 
penalties for both offences would be added up.8 The use of a weapon in an attack against 
an individual was an aggravating fact and led to imprisonment for ten to twelve years 
with hard labour. If the victim died, the offender faced 20 to 30 years in jail, again 
combined with hard labour. Editors and journalists who abused their ‘freedom of 
criticism’ could go to prison for six months to two years. A civil servant who committed 
a crime was not only fired but for the next ten years he would also not get a job in any 
public or semi-public institution. This included private enterprises working with 
government concessions. An employer, director or administrator who accepted a 
candidate from an official blacklist faced dismissal himself. Even employees in private 
enterprises or educational institutes could, with permission of the Ministry of Labour, 
end up on these backlists. Last but not least, the new security legislation allowed the 
government to proclaim a state of siege and to extend it without limitation. Vargas 
indeed governed Brazil with emergency powers until October 1937. 
Though an unprecedented witch-hunt against not only Communists but all 
opponents of Vargas’s government had begun immediately after the suppression of the 
November 1935 barrack revolts, the legal system, inherited from the Old Republic and 
                                                           
7 See PRO/FO 371/19766, A 430/68/6,  
8 ANL President Luis Carlos Prestes, for instance, was sentenced to 16 years and 8 months for his 
role as ringleader of the 1935 Communist barrack revolutions and to another 30 years for two political 
murders he allegedly ordered. 
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confirmed in the 1934 Constitution, still provided due-law procedures, at least formally. 
Except in times of war, no special tribunals could be installed. This prevented the Vargas 
regime from quickly trying and incarcerating those it considered to be a security risk. 
However, in March 1936 a state of war was proclaimed (based on a previous 
constitutional amendment which defined serious subversive activities against the State as 
a war-like situation). On this basis, a Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (TSN) was installed in 
September 1936 (Law No. 244). Though this National Security Court was meant to be a 
temporary institution, targeting primarily the COMINTERN-supported ANL leadership, 
it would remain intact until 1945. It had full responsibility for investigating and trying, in 
the first instance and even retrospectively, those military and civilians who, by order of or 
with support from foreign or international organisations or in relation with them, had 
committed crimes against the country’s external security or carried out attacks against its 
armed forces. This definition included subversive activities against political and social 
institutions which led to political turmoil and, as a consequence, war-like situations. The 
Supremo Tribunal Militar acted as court of second instance and appeal.9  
The TSN was composed of military and civilians. It was part of a repressive 
apparatus which also included: preventative, repressive, and secret police units; a 
National Commission for the Repression of Communists; military-run penal colonies in 
the hinterland and on remote islands. Moreover, the proto-fascist Integralista movement, 
founded in 1932, was used to crush the extreme Left. Sadistic and pro-Nazi police chief 
Felinto Müller arrested hundreds of alleged Communists and introduced new methods of 
torture (Whitehead 1994:42). The fate of some COMINTERN-agents who had 
instigated the November revolts was revealing. German Artur Ewert was tortured and 
his wife raped in his presence; he lived on in a state of insanity. American Victor Allen 
Barron threw himself out of a window during police interrogations; the official version 
being that he committed suicide. The Jewish wife of Communist leader Luís Carlos 
Prestes, Olga Benário, was extradited to Nazi Germany, ignoring her pregnancy; she died 
in Bernburg’s gas chamber (Moraes, 1985: 107-283). However, repression did not stop 
with aliancistas. Leftist deputies (Abguar Bastos, Domingos Velasco, João Mangabeira, 
Otávio da Silva) and senator Abel Chermont who dared to take on Arthur Ewert’s 
defence were incarcerated for 14 months before they were tried (Levine, 1970: 122). 
Vargas’s challenger in the presidential elections scheduled for 1938, Armando de Sales 
Oliveira, and Integralista leader Plínio Salgado were exiled (Dulles, 1967: 190-192). The 
                                                           
9 See PRO/FO 371/19767, A 7763/68/6, Mr Coote to A. Eden, Rio de Janeiro 16. 9. 1936. 
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populist governor of the Federal District, Pedro Ernesto, a tenente (Conniff, 1999: 45-47), 
and his minister of education, Anísio Teixeira, who had opposed the introduction of 
religious education as an option in school curricula both had to leave office. They were 
accompanied by the Rector, eight deans, the director of music and art, and other scholars 
of the University of Rio de Janeiro (Levine, 1970: 135). French Journalist René de 
Jouvenelles was arrested for carrying a membership card of the Society of the Friends of 
Russia (Zuvenel’ 1936). Some of Brazil’s leading artists were attacked as ‘subversive 
elements’: Jorge Amado, Graciliano Ramos, Gilberto Freyre, Cândido Portinari, Oscar 
Niemeyer, and Vargas’s biographer André Carrazoni (Levine, 1970: 135). Interestingly, 
when Robert M. Levine published his doctorate in 1970 and reminded readers of the 
victims of Vargas’s regime, General Médici’s government blocked a Brazilian edition. 
The similarities with practices of the military regime were striking and potentially 
explosive. When the book was eventually allowed to appear in Brazil during the abertura, 
it topped the non-fiction bestseller list for weeks.  
When, on 10 November 1937, Brazilians woke up in the Estado Novo and read a 
new Constitution in the newspapers, a coup within the coup had taken place. Vargas 
remained in office and had been given dictatorial powers. No longer did he have to take 
into account the interests of state particularists and obstructive liberal-democratic 
politicians. He had successfully played off the Right against the Left, and now felt that 
his regime was consolidated enough to prohibit all political parties, including Integralists 
who had hoped for a totalitarian regime with them being in the driving seat. When it 
became clear that the Estado Novo would be an authoritarian-corporatist non-party regime 
and had no use for them, some Integralista leaders tried an unsuccessful armed attack on 
the presidential palace in 1938. They thereby provided Vargas and his military supporters 
with the justification for a further strengthening of the security edifice. If the 1937 
Constitution had already preserved the security council, now called Conselho de Segurança 
Nacional (Wahrlich, 1983: 594; 598-599), Decree-Law No. 474 and Constitutional 
Amendment No. 1 of May 1938 once again aggravated the national security legislation. 
The decree-law introduced new regulations at the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (now 
representing a special branch of the judiciary, the Justiça de Defesa do Estado) which made 
trials a farce. The prosecution had to accuse an alleged offender within 24 hours but 
could try him in his absence. The ‘defence’ was allowed to call two witnesses (though in 
trials with more than five defendants the number of witnesses could not exceed ten) and 
cross-examinations were to last no longer than five minutes. After Prosecution and 
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Council had given their final speech, the pronouncing of judgement had to follow within 
30 minutes. Appeal proceedings had to be completed within 48 hours of the trial.10 The 
ability to promulgate such a law revealed the new realities of power. Though another law 
from June 1938 extended the time limitations again,11 the threat of a Rightist coup had 
been averted. The constitutional amendment introduced capital punishment for serious 
offences such as the violation of Brazil’s national integrity or constitutional order in co-
operation with a foreign power or internationally-operating organisation; the attempt to 
establish a class dictatorship; an armed revolt against public authorities; the instigation of 
a civil war or other acts which threatened the State’s national security or the freedom and 
life of the President.12 This amendment shows clearly that the enemy was now seen to be 
both outside and within Brazil, on the extreme Left as well as the extreme Right.  
American scholar Bailey W. Diffie who visited Brazil during the height of the 
Estado Novo did not share German writer Stefan Zweig’s illusions about Vargas’s regime 
(Zweig 1960). For Diffie (1999: 203), Brazil had become ‘a democratic country with one 
voter who always elects himself as saviour, and then uses arbitrary arrests, red baiting, a 
form of terror, censorship of the press, suppression of free speech, abolition of civil 
rights, nullification of academic freedom, and the systematic oppression of all forms of 
liberal thought and all advocates of liberal thought, as a means of perpetuating his one-
man-rule’. In the name of national security, article 122 of the 1937 Constitution imposed 
harsh censorship over the press, cinema, theatre, and radio. The Código de Imprensa from 
December 1939 forbade any criticism of public authorities. In early 1938, Vargas 
founded a propaganda office, transformed into a Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda 
(DIP) on 27 December 1939 (Abreu, 2001: 1831f.). It appointed the heads of DIPinhos in 
the states13 and thereby centralised, co-ordinated, and controlled all instruments of mass 
communication and popular culture (Gomes, 1982: 109; Schwartzman, 1983: 61-63; 
Wahrlich, 1983: 41, 594-595). The Press and Propaganda Office took responsibility for 
censoring the news and broadcasting the official radio programme ‘A Hora do Brasil’. It 
skilfully created many of the long-standing myths of the Vargas Era, such as the 
                                                           
10 See PRO/FO 371/21422, A 4662/29/6, H. Gurney to Viscount Halifax, Rio de Janeiro 20. 5. 
1938. 
11 See PRO/FO 371/21422, A 5523/29/5, H. Gurney to Viscount Halifax, Rio de Janeiro 28. 6. 
1938.  
12 See PRO/FO 371/21422, 4662/29/6, H. Gurney to Viscount Halifax, Rio de Janeiro 20. 5. 
1938. 
13 See PRO/FO 371/3378, A 2624/2624/6, 1942 Annual Report, N. Charles to A. Eden, Rio de 
Janeiro 15. 2. 1943. 
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President’s portrayal as the ‘father of the poor’, and his carefully staged appearances in 
public. DIP also produced the image of Brazil being a ‘racial democracy.’ In a country 
where the very existence of colour differences could be denied, there was no need for 
addressing problems of racial or ethnic discrimination. Parades on the Dias de Raça rather 
celebrated how far the nation had come in the process of abranqueamento and the 
formation of a ‘new Brazilian.’ ‘The general tendency in Brazil is toward Aryanism’ and 
becoming ‘a European or occidental country’, we read in an official publication (DIP 
1942: 18). DIP’s National Commission for Textbooks depicted coloured people as 
authentic nationals but considered the discussion of differences to be detrimental and 
forbade any pessimism or doubt about the white future of the Brazilian race (Nava 1995: 
64-65, 79). Foreign academics who challenged the myths of Vargas’s ‘democracy’ were 
officially criticised, even when teaching abroad.14 Within Brazil they would lose their job, 
no matter whether charges against them eventually had to be dropped, as in the case of 
American social worker Lois Marietta Williams who, for no other reason than personal 
vengeance, was denounced to the TSN. In her own words, ‘the full extent of my 
communism is that I am a reader of THE NATION and that certain of Professor 
Dewey’s ideas are used in our playground work.’15 This liberalism was already too much 
for the military who in their search for dangerous literature in school libraries even 
blacklisted Mark Twain’s ‘Huckleberry Finn’ (Sharp, 1940: 10-11). No wonder then that 
socially satirical films like Charlie Chaplin’s ‘The Great Dictator’ were immediately 
banned. Editors and journalists who tried to defy censorship and reveal the nature of 
Vargas’s regime faced penalties and repression. Critical foreign correspondents had 
difficulties doing their job. Telegrams going abroad were opened, private clubs 
penetrated by secret agents, and women used as decoys (Diffie, 1999: 200-201; Levine, 
1998: 60-62; Sharp, 1940: 12).  
However, in a non-party regime like the Estado Novo, Vargas’s ‘one-man-rule’ was 
conditional. It depended on the army which had been strengthened, united, and gradually 
depoliticised since 1930. The dictatorial regime placed the federal states’ Military Police 
                                                           
14 Karl Loewenstein’s book Brazil Under Vargas and his critical lectures on Brazil in the United 
States irritated Brazil’s dictator but the State Department considered Loewenstein’s analysis to be realistic. 
See FGV/CPDOC, DE 42.08.05, Ambassador Caffrey to State Department (‘strictly confidential’), Rio de 
Janeiro 16. 12. 1942; and reply Foreign Office to Caffrey, Washington 21. 12. 1942. See also Loewenstein 
1942. 
15 NARA, RG 59, M 1472, roll 18, pp. 0905-0906, U.S. Councelor of the Embassy R. M. Scotten 
(in the name of the ambassador) to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro 11. 2. 1938. See also NARA, RG 59, 
M 1472, roll 18, p. 0904, Department of State/Division of the American Republics, Memorandum, s. l., 21. 
2. 1938; Sharp 1940:11. 
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under the control of central government, completed the purges of the armed forces 
which had gone on since 1935, and put more emphasis on self-recruitment in the forces 
(McCann, 1989: 63-65). The army became the link between developmental and 
educational dictatorship. High-ranking officers occupied decisive positions in the State, 
educational, security, and propaganda apparatus and were involved in the controversial 
nationalisation of ‘foreign’ schools, the strengthening of civic, moral, and physical 
education in curricula, the formation of a youth organisation, and the colonisation of the 
hinterland which included the construction of ‘colônias-escolas’. Military technocrats were 
also represented in the councils and state enterprises which shaped economic and 
infrastructural development. It was in these institutions where close military-civilian co-
operation first developed. In 1939, with the war approaching, the Conselho de Segurança 
Nacional participated in the creation of heavy industry, considered to be essential for 
becoming a ‘great nation’. The siting of a steel plant in Volta Redonda, called the 
Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, was revealing, as Kapstein (1988: 138-141) stresses: 
decisions with regard to location (50 miles away from the coast where its supply would 
have been cheaper but its destruction by naval gunfire more likely), ownership (state-led 
for reasons of national defence, despite more lucrative private offers), and technological 
choice (development of expensive technology to use low-quality Brazilian coal for 
reasons of self-sufficiency in critical times) were all guided by national security 
considerations. When in 1942 pro-American forces within the Vargas administration, led 
by Oswaldo Aranha, gained the upper hand over pro-Axis military and the country 
joined the Anti-Hitler-Coalition, Brazil had another strategic advantage: it benefited from 
its alliance with America economically and politically. In a lecture on the occasion of the 
ESG’s 50th anniversary, Therezinha de Castro reminded her audience that the idea to 
found an elite centre for the collective study and tackling of Brazil’s developmental 
problems can be traced back to the creation of the Curso de Alto Comando para Oficiais e 
Coronéis do Exército in 1942 and the consequent visit of Brazil’s chief of General Staff to 
America’s National War College (Castro, 1999).  
However, the closer the end of the war approached and the link to liberal 
America developed, the more Vargas and his dictatorship became an obstacle. It was the 
military which overthrew the President, not in order to abandon the strategy of national 
security and economic development but to continue it after the inevitable (formal) re-
democratisation.  
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4. The Escola Superior de Guerra: Abandonment of Vargas’s Legacy? 
The significance of the experiences Brazil’s Força Militar Expedicionária (FEB) had 
in the Italian campaign can hardly be exaggerated. Not only did a distinct pro-
Americanism develop but also command officers like Castello Branco were increasingly 
convinced that co-operation with foreign, especially U.S., capital would serve Brazil’s 
interest more than an excessively nationalist strategy (Stepan, 1973: 63-64). This did not 
mean a sell out of national interests but rather to define the most appropriate policy-mix 
to achieve realistic, but ambitious, development goals within a capitalist model of 
accumulation. What was needed was a collective debate, among civilian and military 
elites, about these objectives and the instruments to achieve them. Reliable team work, 
often lacking in the FEB but admired in the U.S. army, was seen as a necessary 
prerequisite to securing victory on the military battlefield; now it was to characterise the 
economic and political campaigns. 
The immediate postwar period brought new conditions. Brazil had accumulated 
gold reserves abroad but this money was soon ‘burned’ in a massive importation of 
consumer goods. Further investment in heavy industries and infrastructural projects 
under General Dutra’s administration was largely funded through foreign credits and 
thereby added to the inflationary effects resulting from the pressure militant labour 
exerted on wages and, as a result, prices. Sangmeister (1992: 230) considers Dutra’s anti-
inflationary policies after 1948 the ‘dress rehearsal for the policy of the “economic 
miracle.”’ This interpretation would, to a certain extent, also be valid for the twin brother 
of ‘economic development’, ‘national security’, though, of course, not with regard to the 
degree of violence employed. The Cold War ended, in Brazil as in other countries of 
Latin America, the experiment in liberalisation which had characterised the first two 
years after World War II. The alliance with the U.S. was renewed in the 1947 Rio Pact. 
Brazil declared the Brazilian Communist Party to be illegal, broke off diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union, and repressed strikes. Brazilian officers were increasingly sent to 
American military academies, including in the Panama Canal Zone, and trained in civic 
action and counter-insurgency (Mols, 1985: 89). 
The eventual foundation of the Escola Superior de Guerra in 1949 was part of this 
anti-democratic turn. More than ever, Brazil’s military, many of them gaúchos or trained in 
Rio Grande do Sul, were convinced that only they were able to plan and implement 
‘national security’ and ‘economic development’, derivations from the Positivist motto of 
‘order and progress’. It was now that these, so far rather diffuse, concepts were 
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theoretically elaborated. Officers studied, in an interdisciplinary way, conventional and 
guerrilla warfare, socio-economic problems, institution-building, and social reforms 
(Stepan, 1973: 56). Graduation from the ESG soon became a pre-requisite for reaching 
the rank of general. By inviting police officers to the Escola (Kruijt, 1996: 265), the 
different branches of the State’s security apparatus were further united. Civilian-military 
relations intensified. Economic leaders and politicians enrolled in the ESG or attended 
courses organised in regional centres. Consequently increasingly-militarised civilian elites 
began to consider the army a partner and, if necessary, a caretaker of their interests 
(Stepan, 1971: 175-177; McCann, 1988: 75).  
The elaboration of the ESG doctrine coincided with Vargas’s second 
government. The creator of the Estado Novo painfully realised that domestic and 
international conditions had fundamentally changed. No longer was he able to govern by 
decree-law or to play off the Left and the Right or the old and the new hegemonic 
powers. The installation of an authoritarian regime was not viable. Representative 
democracy had extremely fragile institutional roots and appealed little to the gaúcho 
President. The explosive mixture of demagogic populism and aggressive attacks on his 
internal and external enemies (Levine, 1998: 82-83), which resulted from this dilemma, 
made it impossible to guarantee stable government; it undermined the semi-corporatist 
structure of society with its underlying concept of regulated citizenship. Vargas and his 
Secretary of Labour, João Goulart, raised expectations they could not meet. The 
increasing social mobilisation frightened the conservative classes and the U.S. The 
administration’s most ardent opponents in the UDN began to depict Vargas as a security 
risk and an obstacle to economic recovery. The ESG was concerned that the military 
might have to compete with labour for scarce resources (Bourne, 1974: 143). In 1954, 
high-ranking military issued a ‘Manifesto of the Colonels’ which warned Vargas of a 
further agitation of workers and a neglect of the army’s demand for modernisation 
(Schneider, 1971: 66). In reality, Vargas’s policies had departed little from those of the 
Estado Novo. The promulgation of a new National Security Law in 1953, the launching of 
a nuclear programme, the construction of hydroelectric power plants, the 
implementation of infrastructural projects, and especially the creation of a state 
monopoly in the strategically important oil industry (Petrobrás) are testimony to the 
President’s continued commitment to national security and economic self-sufficiency. 
His economic policies pleased the dominant nationalist faction within the military but 
not ESG founder Cordeiro de Farias and his Cruzada Democrática which in 1952 won the 
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elections in the Clube Militar. For these conservatives, the participation of foreign capital 
in the exploration of oil resources was absolutely vital and nationalist officers were 
infected by Communist propaganda (Abreu, 2001: 1212, 2100). 
Vargas proved unable to exorcise the many bogeys he had conjured up. However, 
his suicide in 1954 and the dominance of a ‘legalist’ faction within the armed forces 
helped populism to survive for another decade. Vargas’s first elected successor, Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1956-61), hid his more liberal desenvolvimentismo and experiment in 
‘associated-dependent development’ behind a distinctly nationalist rhetoric. His success 
was spectacular and represented a liberal precursor of the 1968-73 ‘economic miracle’. 
However, Kubitschek pleased neither the Centre-Left which, in 1955, had founded an 
Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (Jorrín/Martz, 1970: 436-441) and defended 
government ownership of key industries and control of foreign capital, nor the Right and 
its IPES think tank, created in 1962, which complained that growth had been bought at 
the cost of an economically and politically destabilising inflation. Jânio Quadros’s 
intermezzo in power and especially João Goulart’s ‘nationalist capitalism’ (Sangmeister, 
1992: 232) confirmed the Right’s worst fears and prompted the military’s intervention in 
March 1964.  
 
5. Synthesis 
The similarities in the formation of a national security state by Vargas and the 
military are striking. In 1930 as in 1964, an elected government was overthrown by a 
civilian-military coup. In both cases, the insurgent faction intended to achieve more than 
a mere palace revolution. Whether gaúchos and tenentes in 1930 or Castelistas in 1964, they 
focused on a profound transformation of the political system, the search for a new polity 
in order to implement new policies. Consciously or unconsciously, they stood in the 
tradition of Alberto Tôrres, Oliveira Vianna, and especially Júlio de Castilhos. The option 
for authoritarianism was a function of their interest in generating ‘progress’ or ‘economic 
development’. Either of the two terms meant in reality economic growth, or ‘numerical 
accumulation’, not what contemporary theory understands under ‘development’, namely 
‘the maximum use of a nation’s potential for the greatest benefit of the largest number of 
the inhabitants’ (Burns, 1993: 169-170), or, according to Nohlen’s and Nuscheler’s 
‘magical pentagon’, growth, employment, equality/justice, participation, and 
independence (with each of these five concepts representing both means and objectives) 
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(Nohlen/Nuscheler, 1992: 64-73). Due to the Great Depression, Vargas’s Provisional 
Government had no other choice but to pursue a desarrollo hacia adentro though this was 
well in consonance with gaúcho Positivism and the tenentes’ national-revolutionary ideas. 
The Estado Novo confirmed the policy of economic nationalism and fostered ISI. The 
insurgent military in 1964 advocated economic liberalisation but most of them remained 
authoritarian nationalists, especially the hard-liners who took over firm control in 1967. 
Notwithstanding individual cases of re-privatisation and a closer co-operation with trans-
national companies, ISI was not abandoned and the State remained planning agency, 
regulator, and stern protector of industries deemed to be of strategic interest.  
Both authoritarian regimes initially faced a crisis of hegemony. In 1932 (Paulistas) 
and 1966 (PSD), the elites of the old regime regained influence and forced the new rulers 
to secure their power by political engineering: Vargas convoked elections for a  
Constituent Assembly and introduced a corporatist element which worked in his favour 
while Castelistas, through AI-2 and AI-3, restructured the party system and changed the 
balance of powers. These changes were confirmed in the Constitutions of 1934 and 
1967, respectively. However, this political engineering did not have the desired effect of 
eliminating any political opposition. 1935 saw the creation of a popular front (ANL), 
soon dominated by Communists, and 1967/8 the organisation of labour and student 
movements. Despite the immediate promulgation of national security laws in April 1935 
and 1967, resistance continued and militant factions eventually defended the use of force 
against institutionalised violence: under Vargas, the Intentona Comunista, and under the 
military regime, urban guerrilla groups (with one of them using the acronym ALN which 
resembled that of the popular front). This social mobilisation challenged the two regimes 
but also offered hard-liners a reason for a coup within the coup which had, as its 
functional equivalents, the national security laws of December 1935 and 1969, the 1937 
Constitution and the 1968 AI-5, and the constitutional amendments of 1938 and 1969. 
Arrests and torture increased and became systematised, press and propaganda offices 
(DIP and AERP) imposed censorship and worked on a new image for the country and 
its rulers, and new school curricula in civic and moral education indoctrinated children, 
adolescents, and university students. It was on this basis that in 1938 and 1969 Vargas’s 
‘authoritarian democracy’ and the military’s ‘guided democracy’ were consolidated and a 
conservative modernisation fostered. Some of those who justified a coup in 1930 (gaúcho 
Oswaldo Aranha) and 1964 (Castello Branco) were indeed interested in ‘improving’ 
democracy but in the technocratic philosophy of modernisation which guided the new 
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regimes there was no place for a bargaining between divergent social and political 
interests; the resort to authoritarian means to restructure State and society was the logical 
consequence. However, even after the ‘coup within the coup’ in 1937 and 1968/9, a 
democratic or legalist façade was preserved. This was important since ‘tyrannies do not 
have illegitimate enemies’ and therefore cannot define acts against the political and social 
order as crimes against national security (Abreu, 2001: 3058).  
Similarities between both authoritarian regimes are not restricted to the 
institutional and legal level, but can also be personalised. Francisco Campos authored not 
only the 1937 Constitution but also the military’s first institutional acts and Constitution. 
Carlos Medeiros who took over the Ministry of Justice in 1966 had previously served as 
Vargas’s Solicitor-General in the 1950s. Felinto Müller became a senator and under 
Médici president of ARENA, the regime’s official party. All military presidents except 
Castello Branco and Oliveira Figueiredo were gaúchos, and so were numerous ministers 
and the first president of the ESG, General Cordeiro de Farias. However, due to their 
despising Vargas’s policy during the 1950s, they had all forgotten how much they had 
breathed the spirit of his dictatorial Estado Novo. 
Obviously, there were also differences between both regimes. In 1964, the army 
took over power as an institution. With the victory of the linha dura, it became more the 
incarnation of the State than the guardian of the nation. This was the result of the 
fundamental changes in military recruitment and career patterns since the Estado Novo. In 
the early 1960s, every third cadet came from a military family and more than 90% of 
them had been educated within the army since the age of 12 (Mols, 1985: 89). A de-
revolutionised army demobilised and depoliticised society. For Castello Branco, and even 
more so the hard-liners, the crisis of 1963/4 was more than an intra-elitist conflict or a 
very limited mobilisation and therefore did not allow the co-optation of dissent factions 
or new groups. What was at stake, in their perception, was nothing less than the capitalist 
model of accumulation (Flynn, 1978: 317). International Communism seemed to have 
penetrated not only labour but also parts of the middle and upper classes, as student 
revolts, guerrilla activities, and accusations by liberation theologists proved. Therefore, as 
Skidmore stresses, the differential treatment of lower class elements and members of the 
elite by legislator, police, and courts was no longer valid (Skidmore, 1988: 126; Skidmore 
1999:174). Violence became more frequent and was more systematically organised 
though in Brazil repression never reached the same scale as in Chile after 1973 or 
Argentina after 1976. Even so, more than 20 years of military dictatorship and human 
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rights violations have cast a long shadow which can still be seen in today’s Brazil. Those 
who after the long transición pactada advocated a continuation of the Vargas era, forgot 
that the ‘father of the poor’ was also the godfather of the military’s security state. As one 
SNI officer expressed it: 1964 had to be seen as the ratification of the military’s historic 
decision in November 1935 (Giordani, 1986: 29). 
 
The formation of a National Security State after 1930 and after 1964 
 
1930 ‘Revolution’ (COUP)  1964 ‘Revolution’ (COUP) 
Provisional Government (1930-4) 
double rule of gaúchos and tenentes, 
repression and censorship moderate 
Castello Branco government (1964-7) 
witch-hunt in the first three month after 
the  coup (AI-1, expiry date: June 1966) 
but then repression and censorship 
moderate; creation of a secret service SNI 
Elites of the Old Regime regain 
influence,  see 
1932 São Paulo’s Counterrevolution 
-some citizens deprived of political rights 
but 
 policy of reconciliation: engineered 
1933/34  
 elections to Constituent Assembly  
-tenentes lose influence as a political group 
January 1934 Góes Monteiro’s 
Memorandum failure of ‘Revolution’/ 
new security architecture 
Elites of the Old Regime regain 
influence,  see 
1965 Elections in States  
-2 elected PSD governors confirmed but 
 political engineering: AI-2/AI-3 
restructure  
 party system and strengthen executive 
power 
-‘linha dura’ gains upper hand 
March 1967 Castello Branco’s farewell 
words  failure of ‘linha branda’/acceptance 
of a security state 
February 1934 Lei No. 23873 
creation of a Conselho de Defesa Nacional; 
other ‘national defence’ institutions 
followed 
 
July 1934 Constitution 
Janus-faced (contains principles of liberal 
constitutionalism and state corporatism); 
mentioning of Conselho Nacional de Segurança 
January 1967 Constitution  
end of the experiment in ‘authoritarian  
liberalism’ or a democracia guiada 
March 1935 Organisation of a popular 
front (ANL) 
1967/8 Labour and student movements 
April 1934 Lei de Segurança Nacional 
(38) 
for the first time, a special legislation for 
crimes against ‘national security’ 
1967 Lei de Segurança Nacional  (314) 
the military’s first detailed definition of 
crimes against national security  
 December 1968 AI-5 (Start of COUP 
WITHIN THE COUP) 
first AI without expiry date closed 
Congress and state assemblies and 
suspended the 1967 Constitution; SNI 
state within the state 
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November 1935 Intentona Comunista 
despite draconian security law 
Organisation of an urban guerrilla (e.g. 
ALN) against institutionalised violence 
December 1935 Lei de Segurança 
Nacional (136) 
strengthening of national security 
legislation; proclamation of a state of war 
during which a Tribunal de Segurança 
Nacional operated. 
March 1969 Lei de Segurança Nacional 
(510) 
strengthening of national security 
legislation  
October 1937 Constitution of the 
Estado Novo (COUP WITHIN THE 
COUP) 
creation of a Justiça da Defesa do Estado 
which makes the TSN a permanent 
institution 
 
April 1938 attempted Integralist 
counter-coup 
 
May 1938 Lei de Segurança Nacional 
(774) 
new TSN regulations, trials become a farce 
 
1938 Constitutional Amendment No 1 
further strengthening of national security 
legislation (introduction of death penalty) 
1969 Constitutional Amendment No. 1 
further strengthening of national security 
legislation (introduction of death penalty) 
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